Shahzad Masood Roomi
A power sharing deal between rival Afghan presidential candidates finally reached after months of tension. Timing of this deal is indeed intriguing as coalition prepares to withdraw. But an even more intriguing aspect of this entire political drama is the secrecy about how this deal was reached and under what conditions. It is worth remembering that earlier both sides had accused each other of fraud during the political standoff. But now suddenly, aides from both sides have confirmed the signing of the deal.
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Irrespective of the fact, how and under what conditions this deal was reached. The real question every political analyst must ask is, Will it work? and if yes then how long this deal would last? Unfortunately, the content of the deal made available in public domain and the political history of Afghanistan both indicate that this deal would be nothing more than a temporary arrangement to bring some kind of political stability so that US can sell this to masses back home as their success in this protracted war before they leave the country by the end of this year.
The twitchy history of political harmony further endorses this assessment. In 1993, when Afghanistan was plunged in a bloody civil war, a similar power sharing deal was signed. It was called Islamabad Accord. In that accord, power was shared between more than 10 varying factions including Mohammad Yunus Khalis' breakaway faction of the Hezb-i-Islami, which has boycotted all past agreements. Afghanistan's minority Shi`ites, allies of Hekmatyar who have been demanding greater representation, were given the finance and health ministries. Major protagonists in that political episode were Tajik Ahmed Shah Masood and Pushtun Hekmatyar.
Earlier that year, a peace deal was reached when after a year of shelling Hekmatyar's forces captured Defense Minister Masood's ministry building in Kabul. Hekmatyar is designated prime minister and a cease-fire is to be imposed. This peace deal, though, fulfilled the political ambitions of Hekmatyar to become Afghan Prime Minister but it never brought any peace in Afghanistan. The peace deal was brokered by foreign states (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran) and was not a native solution reached by varying Afghan factions themselves. Removal of Ahmed Shah Masood from defense ministry also didn’t help. The deal was ended just after two days when, as per archives of Library of Congress, Hekmatyar's allies of Hezb-e Wahdat again began rocketing areas in Kabul. Both the Wahhabi Pashtun Ittehad-i Islami of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf backed by Saudi Arabia and the Shia Hazara Hezb-e Wahdat supported by Iran remained involved in heavy fighting against each other. The envisioned peace could never be achieved as the peace accord miserably failed to address the far deeper fault lines of tribal society like ethnic, linguistic, tribal rifts.
But the failure of 1993 Afghan peace accord is not without precedent. A more recent example of similar political failure can be seen in Iraq, where the US invasion created an environment of frenzied sectarian strife fueled by both Saudi Arabia and Iran. And these history of failed peace making adopting non-inclusive approaches and ignoring the social realities are the reason behind the caveats for this recent power share deal signed between Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani. Evidently, the country is heading towards a similar political log jam witnessed in 1990s.
Apart from its inability to address these existing ethnic, sectarian and tribal fault lines this new deal have its intrinsic vulnerabilities as well. The provision of creating a new administrative position called Chief Executive Officer (CEO), which will be held by Abdullah Abdullah or one of his nominee, is going to create serious constitutional crisis in Afghanistan as it is certainly not clear at this point in time that how administrative powers would be balanced between these two power centers. With this political delicacy, new Afghan government would also have to face the threats from Taliban insurgency. These concerns are being raised from within Afghan intelligentsia as well. "There will be two powers in the government, and it will be very difficult for them to work together," said Sediq Mansoor Ansari, an analyst and director of the Civil Societies Federation to AFP.
Furthermore, this power sharing deal would put a big question mark on Afghan democracy. People would have no idea about what happened to their votes. In short term, this may not seems to be an issue at all but it would cause dearly to Afghan state’s cohesion in coming months.
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It remains an unfortunate aspect of Afghan history that the country has been in perpetual state of war since last 40 years and there is no end in sight even now. A fragile country, with so many social fault lines, would remain vulnerable to political edginess if foreign players keep meddling into Afghan political affairs particularly Iran, India, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. US desperation for a political settlement is quite fathomable. As far as the American role in making both parties to reach this deal is concerned, by the initial American reaction it would be prudent to think that this deal has blessings from Washington. Americans wants to sign BSA (Bilateral Security Agreement) before draw down of the US/NATO forces completes by end of this year. This agreement, if signed, would enable the US military to stay in Afghanistan for minimum 10 years. Americans still believe that they can eliminate offcuts of Afghan resistance. Keeping the Afghan security profile of last 13 years, it would be prudent to assume that this idea wouldn’t work either. But it certainly would put the Americans into a position to protect the Afghan government. For now, the future of this power sharing deals hangs with just a reedy fiber of hope and optimism.
