Chinese Troops and Turkish Military Band to Participate in Pakistan Day Parade: ISPR

ISPR, on Monday, announced that Chinese troops and Turkish military bands will participate in Pakistan Day parade which is to be held on 23rd of this month in Islamabad.

DG ISPR Major General Asif Ghafoor stated that Chinese Army troops will arrive in Islamabad to participate in Pakistan Day celebrations. A Turkish military band will also participate in the parade.

The parade is organized by joint staff headquarters in Rawalpindi, which oversees the three armed forces of Pakistan.Pakistan in 2015, held its first Pakistan Day parade after a hiatus of seven years. The display of pageantry aimed at showing the country has the upper hand in the fight against terrorists as the nation reeled from the worst militant attack in its history as 142 children were killed an army-run school in Peshawar.

The decision to invite friendly countries in national day parade is a significant move by Islamabad in the context of Indian diplomatic overtures to isolate Pakistan in the international community. This is not the only occasion when Pakistan is going to use its military diplomacy to thwart the perception of being isolated globally. Last year, Pakistan held international PACES multilateral military games in Lahore in which troops from 16 nations participated

Pakistan Army Will Pay Every Price To Make CPEC Reality: Gen Raheel

By Shahzad Masood Roomi
“We are aware of all the campaigns against CPEC and I vow that the security forces are ready to pay any price to turn this long cherished dream into reality,”

This was stated by Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sharif on Friday while he visited the HQ of newly raised Special Security Division (SSD) in Pakistan Army which has been given charge of security responsibilities of CPEC projects.

COAS was given a detailed briefing over raising of the force and the security threats faced by the CPEC project. Gen Raheel, after briefing, instructed SSD to take all possible measures to make all CPEC related projects secure including the security of work force involved in the projects.

What COAS Meant by 'Entering Into Most Difficult Phase of Operation'?

By Shahzad Masood Roomi

While speaking to the APEX committee KPK meeting in Peshawar, COAS has said that state is entering in the most difficult and dangerous phase of operation. He also said that return of Temporary Displaced People (TDPs) is top priority for Pakistan Army.

One may wonder what does "entering most difficult phase of operation" it actually mean.

The answer is simple. COAS has stated the obvious. Sanctuaries of terrorists in FATA have been practically eliminated and what now has been left of TTP is mainly consists of sleeper cells which work in coordination with group's top command hiding in Afghanistan. Tracking these sleeper cells in urban centers, eliminating the TTP's top brass is critical for the final success against TTP. 

Why Gen Raheel's Decision of Not Taking Extension Is Right One?

By Shahzad Masood Roomi

So, it is official now!

COAS Pakistan Army, Gen Raheel Sharif does not want extension in his service and will retire on due date according to DG ISPR Lt. Gen Asim Bajwa.

According to DG ISPR, COAS has made it clear that he believed in Pakistan army as strong institution.

Pakistan Army is a great institution. I don’t believe in extension and will retire on the due date. Efforts to root out terrorism will continue with full vigor and resolve.

I was aware that the conflict was not against ‘our own people’: Gen (r) Tariq Khan

Decorated with a Hilal-e-Imtiaz (Military) and a Legion of Merit, recently retired Lt Gen Tariq Khan commanded several operations against Taliban and other militants, including the Battle of Bajaur, or Operation Sherdil. Ali K Chishti spoke to him about militancy, defense policy and civil-military ties.


You transformed the Frontier Corps into a fierce fighting force and won the Battle of Bajaur? How was the experience fighting the war?

A conflict in our own area is hardly a war, and a military success on one’s own territory is a no-winner. Success is measured in other terms. The military can only create conditions for those measures to be put in place that contribute to real victory.

Fighting in FATA was a new experience for me. It involved me in a conflict in an area in which I was one of the people and very close to them. Being familiar with the geography and the peculiarities of the area, I was aware that the conflict was not against ‘our own people’ but against elements who had forced themselves on the population through coercion and violence. In my experience, the people felt abandoned and neglected, so the battle we were fighting was to establish the lost writ of the government as well as to empower the people and the tribes to take control of their own area and their own destiny. It was tragic in that the fallout of battle touched the lives of many innocent women and children, who became anonymous casualties of war. We were restricted in our use of firepower to avoid collateral damage.

How can we achieve that ‘real victory’?

There are many angles to the problem.

There is a military angle, in which success against any insurgency and controlling the militants is measured in four critical ways – Do you control the roads? Is the population supporting the military? Are government offices, such as the political agent’s office and the courts, functional? And lastly, do you have visibility on the area’s exits and entries?

Then there is a social angle to it – that the local populace has the confidence to reject the ideological or political agenda of the militants. Ideologically, it is important not to allow hostile narrative and propaganda to be broadcast uncontested. The radio station run by Mullah Fazlullah, popularly known as Mullah Radio, and effective use of international press by Muslim Khan, are two such examples. Their narrative was not countered. This problem still persists.

There is also an administrative angle, which involves equal opportunities, justice and fair play, even distribution of resources, and development. Without these, parallel systems emerge and non-state actors fill up the vacuum.

There is also a political angle to the problem. Some of our politicians played to the galleries. Extremists and militants found a political face in various parties, which afforded them greater political space and relevance.

Poor governance creates an environment that is exploited by hostile agencies. International funding, external interference, and political interfacing (such as Baloch separatist movements in the UK) also provide resources and legitimacy to militancy.

In order to succeed against militancy, we will need tangible steps and a firm resolve demonstrated through improved governance.

The threat from India is permanent

And is our number one enemy internal or external? Has the army’s security doctrine changed in the recent years?

It is not one or the other. Our external threats are limited to India, who we consider an enemy state, and who will always undertake activity to undermine our stability just as we would, given a similar opportunity.

Insurgency and militancy must be dealt with at our earliest, but it is a situational feature and not a permanent one. We cannot remove India from the map, and so the threat from India is a permanent feature. This threat needs a response in the form of deterrence.

When I was in the field, I had evidence of Indian support to militancy in FATA and Balochistan. They fund and resource militancy in a big way. I fail to understand the international indifference to the numerous Indian consulates along Pakistan’s Western border in Afghanistan. Surely they are not in the business of processing visas.

Thus, Pakistan’s external and internal threats both gravitate towards India.

So are we going after all the militant organizations, including those fighting against India and Afghanistan?

It is only the state’s prerogative to declare war or project an aggressive or friendly posture towards any other country. This right does not belong to any individual or community, or ‘non-state actors’. If one does not agree with a government’s stance, in a democracy it can be voted out of power.

If we try and find justifications for such individuals or groups, or afford platforms for their apologists, we will not become a strong state. As such, there is no room for such Jihadists in a modern state.

Afghanistan and Pakistan have been accusing each other of allowing their territory to be used against each other. How can we overcome this mutual mistrust?

Pakistan has taken the brunt of the blame for the international failure in Afghanistan, and failed to present a counter-narrative for the better part of 14 years to the one-way harangue it suffered at the hands of an international media fed by hostile agencies.

The relief and rotation plan for the ISAF forces in Afghanistan allowed failures to breed. In their six-month tenures, how could commanders come to grips with battleground and geography, let alone a subtle understanding of intelligence matters? All these international groups used interpreters and intelligence provided by the Northern Alliance, which has always blamed Pakistan for supporting the Taliban. These contingents carried home a poor image of the Pakistan and broadcasted it all over the globe. This was worsened by ISAF troops’ unprecedented military defeat in Afghanistan. Pakistan was a convenient scapegoat.

I have such evidence as Indian shell dressings and medicines, and even a captured Indian vehicle with Hanuman painted on the door. But the evidence we present is explained away as being taken away from kidnapped Indian road workers. It is important that the people we present the evidence to, are willing to acknowledge your suspicions.

We did not need a National Action Plan to arrest criminals

The new Indian government has been hostile towards Pakistan. How should Islamabad respond?

We have no plans or stated intent to attack but India wishes to conduct a military offensive if and when they think it is ‘cost effective’; and are always threatening to do so.

A passive response to India’s aggression will only lead to more aggression. This is not bravado, or India-centric thinking. This is a logical response.

Why should we allow India to shoot across the Line of Control and what possible justification allows a civilized country to do that?

What are your views on the newly formulated National Action Plan? And has the military’s policy changed all of a sudden?

So far, the National Action Plan appears to me as more of a publicity stunt. Its success is being measured in terms of arrests of criminals. We did not need a National Action Plan to arrest criminals, but to simply implement the law as it exists.

What we need is depoliticizing the police, judicial reforms, madrassa reforms, reigning in the Maulvis, immigration control, dismantling banned outfits, arresting those responsible for sectarian conflict, stopping the free flow of funding for terrorism, and disbanding private armies and unauthorized armed guards.

As for the military’s policy, nothing has happened suddenly. Of the 48,000 square kilometers of combat zone, 35,000 were cleared during General Kayani’s time. North Waziristan was not taken on for a host of reasons and one of them was lack of political support.

Similarly, in Karachi, the government was uncomfortable with an Army-led response to the lawlessness in Karachi. Even now there is a sizeable resistance to these operations mounted by some political parties, specifically those that prevented them during their tenure when General Kayani was the COAS.

The institution has remained consistent as far as its functional philosophy is concerned. Its performance may have fluctuated on account of varying influences, but its intent must never be put to question.

There is talk of a serious mistrust between civil and military leaders. Is this a soft coup?

In my 37 years of service, I have never seen the Army conduct itself the way it has in the recent past, bending over backwards to avoid interference in the government’s affairs, even when the conduct of the government necessitated it. I know this because of my presence on many occasions where the government had asked for a foreign policy paper from GHQ when it needed one. Incidentally, it usually contradicted any suggestions or recommendations in their subsequent actions. I have met ministers who have pleaded for a briefing before a foreign visit and visited GHQ incognito to get direction. I can assure you that the Army has neither been interested nor overbearing in these matters.

The Karachi Operation is an outcome of the government’s request and not an Army initiative as some have come to mistakenly believe.

It is important that a forum be organized where the public be informed about the civil military relationship; and to define who is responsible for what and who must be held. Without such a forum, governments will continue justifying their own failures by blaming the Army for not allowing them the space they needed to perform.

Source: http://defence.pk/threads/gen-r-tariq-khan-interview.405099/#ixzz3paENZ0ib

Pakistan Army to Increase Its Numerical Strength

Shahzad Masood Roomi

Keeping in mind the precarious security situation on the western border, Pakistan has decided to increase the numerical strength of its ground forces. In this regard, Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) Kakul will increase the recruitment of its cadets who are trained and inducted in Pakistan Army as commissioned officers. The increase will be one third of current recruitment strength of PMA which is around 500 officers annually.

Chief of Army Staff, Gen Raheel Sharif visited PMA on Wednesday, earlier this week, and reviewed the progress  of PMA's capacity enhancement project.   

“The visit focused on reviewing the current training regime for cadets and PMA’s capacity enhancement projects including progress work on the 4th Pakistan Battalion,” read a statement issued by ISPR. 

Right now, PMA intakes 500 cadets each year in two batches who then divided into three battalions during the training. Now that strength would increase to around 650 as addition 150 cadets would make 4th battalion at PMA.

As the number of commissioned officers would increase after this decision it implies that number of troops would also increase proportionally.

No timeline was given for the setting up of the new battalion at PMA, but insiders say the academy could be ready for the increased intake within 12-18 months.

Apart from mounting threats of non-state violent actors from across the Afghan border there are other factors which necessitated the requirement of additional troops and increase in size of Pakistan Army. These includes continuing involvement in tribal areas, where troops are expected to stay at least till 2019; the creation of a security division for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor; and increased requirement of officers for paramilitary forces like Frontier Corps and Rangers. Additionally, troops are getting increasingly engaged with UN peacekeeping operations and disaster relief operations.Last and most importantly, Indian escalation along the LoC and aggressive posturing towards Pakistan also played its role.

The internal factors behind this increase in Army's size are more worrisome indicator of collapse of civilian law and order institutions and forcing Pakistan Army and paramilitary forces to police the cities. In Karachi and Baluchistan paramilitary forces are involved in complex urban operations and their disengagement from these areas seems less likely in foreseeable future. Similarly, Pakistan Army may have to remain in FATA beyond 2019 as the security profile of Afghanistan is getting bleaker with every passing day. Politicizing regular police force has created severe challenge for Pakistan Army which is already fighting a asymmetrical and distributed war amid growing regional tension with India. Pakistan will have to remain watchful in this regards as the plan to convert Pakistan Army into a glorify police force is well known agenda of hostile forces.   

Tactical Drones for Pakistan's Special Service Group (SSG)

This still taken from the official ISPR video footage of Pak-China joint exercise in Bahadur Range (Attock) shows COAS Pakistan Army Gen Raheel Sharif holding a UAV which indicates that special forces (SSG) are now adopting the deployment of tactical drones for real-time situational awareness during the ops. This force multiplying technology increases the odds of operational success many times while reducing the risk factor for own troops. This technology would be of great value in high risk operations in buildup areas and dense forest areas like Shweal valley of North Wazirstan Agency in FATA where Pakistan Army has launched the last leg of Operation Zarb e Azb.

Increasing Accidents of Mi-17: Pakistan Army Needs a New Workhorse?

By Shahzad Masood Roomi

Mi-17 helicopters have been backbone of Pakistan Army Aviation (PAA) since many years now. These machines have played a remarkable role in ongoing counter insurgency and counter terrorism operations. During natural calamities like floods and earthquakes these are priority option of Pakistan Army for search and rescue operations. 

But due to this workload of every kind, the fleet of PAA's Mi-17s is rusting fast and the accidents are on the rise. On 6th August, PAA suffered second major accident involving Mi-17 killing all 12 on board including pilots and paramedical team of Pakistan Army near Mansehra, in KPK province.

Earlier, on 8th May 2015, 8 people were killed  in an Mi-17 crash in Naltar in District Gilgit, including the ambassadors of Norway and the Philippines, as well as the spouses of the Indonesian and Malaysian ambassadors to Pakistan.

Apart from these two incidents, scores of troops have lost their lives.

On 3rd July 2006, in a terrible accident of Mi-17 crash, 26 Pakistan Army soldiers were killed.

On 11th July 2012, A Pakistan Army Mi-17 crashed in Sarkdu in which left 5 dead and 3 injured. Major Shoaib was injured in the incident and lost his life next day due to heavy burns on his body. 

Maj Shoaib Shaheed - Sakrdu 2012

It is evident that Pakistani Mi-17 have become older and rusty due to excessive operations during the last 10 years and Pakistan Army needs the replacement or up-gradation of Mi-17s. This is not going to be an easy undertaking as right now Pakistan Army is using approx. 100 of these Russian machines. Availability of Russian spare parts has remained a big issue as well due to heavy political clout of New Delhi in Moscow till recent past.
 

Political Dimensions:
The latest crash incident of Mi-17 in Mansehra has triggered a political debate in the country on Pak-US/West strategic partnership in war on terror in which Pakistan has played a key role being the front-line ally since 9/11.

Western alliance failed to provide Pakistan Army with the required hardware and technologies in this war due to which strong suspicions about the future of this partnership are being raised in Islamabad. It has been noticed within the strategic circles in the country that the US never supplied Pakistan with key components like attack helicopters and drones in this war due to which Pakistan Army had to suffer fatalities at a very high rate.

According to media reports, the US never considered Pakistan's demand for sophisticated technology for its COIN operations. Sources has confirmed that Pakistan had been requesting the US for new or leased helicopters and transfer of drone technology since the onset of WoT, unfortunately, the US despite paying Pakistan from Collision Support Fund, never agreed to provide technologies required for effective operations against terrorists in FATA.

Pakistan was only supplied with second hand Cobra and few Mi-17s which were maintained in airworthy conditions by tireless efforts of Pakistani technicians. 

But Pakistan is not the only country where Mi-17 have met with accidents. The list of crash incident is quite long and include all major operator of this machine.


Latest Developments:

Pakistan Army has been looking for suitable attack and utility helicopter of Western origin. Pakistani delegations visited Turkey for number of times in this respect. Finally, Pakistan signed deal with Russian Federation directly. Fluid regional geopolitics played a key role in change of heart in Moscow; a key Indian ally. Ice began to break from President Musharraf's visit to Russia in 2005. After years of military diplomacy, despite attempts by India to prevent Russia from supplying Pakistan with latest military hardware, Pakistan Army leadership was able to convenience Moscow to sign a deal of supplying high tech Russian hardware directly to Islamabad. Pakistan signed a deal with Russia to procure Mi-35 Gunship helicopter, although Pakistan still seeking a replacement for Mi-17s. 

Mi-35 Gunship Helicopter

But now Pakistan is in position to acquire spare parts or new units to replace those destroyed in accidents. Chinese have made big stride in military hardware and China is producing Z-18 and Z-8 helicopters... But so far, Pakistan is only interested in Z-10 Gunships. 3 Z-10s are being evaluated by PAA.

In the long run, Pakistan will be best served to cooperate with China on a joint venture to produce a reliable utility helicopter in medium weight category. For short to medium term, Pakistan must enhance strategic cooperation with Russia to get latest version of Mi-17 and local maintenance facility. Pakistan Army is in desperate need of both utility and gunship helicopter and in given geopolitical scenario of the region and improvement in Pakistan's economy, Russian machines are feasible to acquire both politically and financially.

Yemen Crisis: Dangerous Miscalculations

By Shahzad Masood Roomi

As Pakistani Prime Minister and COAS are in Riyadh in a bid to cool tempers in the Gulf kingdom over Pakistan's refusal to provide troops for war in Yemen, the situation in Yemen is getting worse by the day. The visit is being seen as an attempt by senior political and military leadership to make Saudi ruling elite understand that why Pakistan could not join Saudi offences in Yemen. The outcome of this tour would play a critical role in discourse of Saudi actions in Yemen. But regardless of the outcome of the PM's visit, it is obvious that the conflict in Yemen has grown too big for the Saudis alone to resolve it and bring it to a logical termination. So what went wrong in Saudi strategic thinking regarding Houthis in Yemen?

This is what happens when strategic miscalculations are made while weighing the policy options. Unfortunately, Saudi Arabia is not the only country in this crisis which made dangerous miscalculations. Pakistan’s political leadership also failed to analyze the situation and potential outcome scenarios and now consequently another diplomatic crisis has emerged at the bilateral level between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia on this issue of Yemen.  

Saudi Arabia launched indiscriminate bombing campaign in Yemen against the Houthis rebels (Iranian Proxies) without much intelligence collection about their strengths & weaknesses and without identifying and categorizing the key targets for air campaign. Next, the Saudi ruling monarch assumed that Pakistan, Turkey and Egypt would come to help and fight their war in Yemen. But to their utter surprise none of these transpired.

Houthis proved too defiant for Saudi air assault and this is not the first time the futility of applying the air power alone has been proven. Earlier, the US campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq met early tactical wins but later on proved too costly for Washington as senseless aerial bombing in Afghanistan and Iraq turned large portion of local populace in these countries against the US. The price of these air-power oriented military campaigned is being paid by US troops on ground (which like Saudi operation joined the campaign after the aerial assaults) and the policymakers who have no idea how to bring these two protracted wars to an end with face saving exits. Saudis have committed the same strategic blunder here. Instead of studying the aftermath of American air campaigns, they repeated the same mistakes.

After a month of bombing the Saudis were convinced that they have forced the Houthis to come to the negotiation table but today, according to BBC, Saudi-led coalition warplanes have struck Houthi rebels across Yemen in fresh raids, two days after announcing the end of a month-long air campaign.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32430003

While according to Fox News, Yemen's defiant Shiite rebels press their offensive as Saudi Arabia launches airstrikes

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/04/23/yemen-defiant-shiite-rebels-press-their-offensive-as-saudi-arabia-launches

It left the fate of "Restoring Hope", which was announced on Tuesday after a month of bombing, hanging in balance as it looks like Saudi led coalition is again back to square one.

Saudi air strikes are being complemented by artillery support as well. But due to lack of clear target identification and damage assessment the completion of the objectives remains uncertain and elusive.

How the outcome of this new round of aerial bombing is going to be any different from the previous one? This is the question no one in Saudi led coalition has any answer of.

Military sales of weapons to from the US and Russia to the Gulf States is also fueling the fire. According to the Guardian, "Security experts express fears for region’s stability amid record weapons sales from west and Russia’s missile deal with Iran." An estimated $18 Billion have already been spent on weapon imports by Gulf States with Saudi Arabia and UAE remain the biggest buyers of western weapon systems.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/23/the-18bn-arms-race-middle-east-russia-iran-iraq-un

All these rapid developments are not only shrinking Saudi options in Yemen but this fluid strategic milieu is creating problems for Pak-Saudi bilateral relations as well. In Pakistan, both the political leadership and the masses are clearly divided on the Yemen issue while Pakistan Army remains seriously concerned about this fast unfolding scenario. This is why from the onset of this crisis, Pakistan Army leadership showed concerns over this crisis.

A faction in Pakistani policy analysts and experts of defense and security considers that PM Nawaz Sharif made a mistake while assuring Saudi king full support without consulting with army leadership.

http://www.dawn.com/news/1172460/nawaz-assures-saudi-king-salman-of-pakistan-army-support

And the way the stance of both Pakistani government and the Saudis dignitaries (visited Pakistan frequently in recent weeks) has been changed over the time, it is evident that the assumption of Prime Minister Nawaz assuring Pakistan Army's troops to Saudi king is not off the mark. The fact that PML(N) government was unwilling to reveal what exactly Saudis had demanded from Pakistan Army also amplify this assumption. 

An info-graphic appeared in one of the leading Arab news agencies at start of the Yemen war 2015, showing Pakistan as a part of Saudi air campaign. Pakistan never joined Saudi coalition forces; not so far! 

During the first few days of the conflict, the news given by the entire Arab media was that Pakistan wanted to be involved in Saudi led campaign in Yemen. Then it was reported that Saudis wanted a 3-4 year deployment of a full Pakistan Army corps under their command. (Pakistan has 9 active corps. 7 defensive while two strike crops. While a specialized nuclear strategic force command handles country’s nuclear arsenal). After few days, Arab media and few of their Pakistani supporters start giving impression that all Saudi Arabia had ever asked for was political support only and that they were not interested in any Pakistani troops. Then Pakistani parliament debated on the issue and news is that any threat to Saudi sovereignty would provoke a strong action from Pakistan but Pakistan would not send any troops to Yemen or Saudi Arabia unless that threat is materialized. This stance by Pakistan drew severe criticism from Saudi Arabian allies especially from UAE.

But if we analyze the Saudi request of putting Pakistani troops under the Saudi command closely, it has a major intrinsic problem with it which Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif could not realize, and that is the demand of giving Pakistani troops under the Saudi military command.  Pakistan was fully aware that Hothis would be never able to mount a serious threat against Saudi Arabia so the resolution included the possibility of sending troops to Saudi Arabia.  But the problem is when command and control of the troops will be changed all Pakistani units will receive their commands from Saudis and not from Pakistani commanders. Riyadh would be controlling the deployment of these troops not Rawalpindi. Once under Saudi authorities, Pakistani troops will be storming to Yemen. There is no doubt about it! This is something Pakistan Army is fully aware of and the potential outcome for troops back at home as well.

The fact is that Pakistan Army cannot afford to plunge into an overseas crisis with complex geopolitical and sectarian dynamics regardless of true nature of Saudi demand about Pakistani troops. But at the same time, Pakistan can also not afford to turn away a strategic partner like Saudi Arabia. There are ways in which Pakistan Army can help Saudi forces in their operations against Houthis. Pakistan Army can share its experiences against the asymmetric militants. But the best thing that Pakistan can do is honestly tell the Saudis about the strategic, operational and tactical miscalculations they have made during the last six months on Yemen.

There cannot be any better choice for this job than General Raheel Sharif. He has fought Pakistani case through military diplomacy in Afghanistan and now the bilateral relations between Pakistan Army and Afghan Army are taking a new turn in positive direction. If Pakistan Army has learnt its lessons regarding Afghanistan and now it is pursuing other options to protect the same vital national interests for which it supported militant factions against Kabul previously, convincing our Saudi friends on the same strategic mindset regarding Yemen must not be impossible. But before telling Saudis about using soft-power in Yemen, Pakistan Army needs to tell the same to Pakistan's own political elite particularly to ruling PML(N). Apart from that, Pakistan must declare its policy regarding the holy cities of Makkah and Madina to end any possible strategic confusion in this regard.

On the Question of Pakistani Troops involvement in Yemen

There is no doubt that the conflict in Yemen has strong sectarian overtones in its implications. This is more accurate in context of Pakistan where government finds itself in a strategic dilemma of choosing to join Saudi led coalition fighting in Yemen or Not. But this must be understood that there are other dynamics of this conflict. Most important of them is the poor track record of Yemeni governments towards various ethnic factions of the society. The history of Yemen prior to 1990 when the country was united, is also important. South and North Yemen had conflicting foreign policies and were part of opposing blocks during the Cold War era. The crisis of Yemen is manifestation of years of real politics revolving around power grabbing catalyzed by foreign interference.

Ironically, with just few exceptions, the commentary and analysis of the crisis revolves only around Sectarian implications which Pakistan possibly can face as a consequence of any decision Islamabad is about to take on the Saudi request of sending the troops. All the other aspects are being overlooked in this debate. Furthermore, Pakistan has not announced any decision in this regard so far. All the news in international media are based on pure speculations. There is a higher probability that Pakistan will play a role similar to 1997 OIC summit when Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif arranged one-to-one meeting between then Saudi Crown Prince, Abdullah and Iranian President Rafsanjani. This is the best possible discourse for Pakistan right now.

Any participation in the active war in Yemen against Shia rebels or ignoring the Saudi request all together would not serve Pakistan's interests. It must be cleared that Pakistani troops participating in join military exercises with their Saudi counterparts have nothing to do with Pakistan's decision regarding Saudi request contrary to what has been reported by some Arab media houses in this regard.

Pakistan's Policy Option on Yemen Conflict

Shahzad Masood Roomi

Since last two days, Pakistan has been engulfed in a hotted debate on weather it should accept the Saudi Arabian request of sending its troops to protect the Kingdom. So far, Pakistani government hasn't replied to this request and the matter is being examined as per foreign office spokesperson's remarks.

Pakistan must take a clear stance and adopt a out of box strategy in Yemen crisis. So far, the government is sending only ambiguous messages. The large part of media is reporting that the decision of sending troops to Saudi Arabia has been made already but the Defense Minister is negating these reports by issuing statement which are being perceived very differently in media circles.

“Pakistan will stand by Saudi Arabia by all means if the kingdom’s territorial sovereignty is in danger.”, Defense Minister Khawaja Asif said.

Pakistan simply cannot afford to become a party in this conflict as Pakistan has close ties with both Iran and Saudi Arabia and any strategic miscalculation in this conflict can open a Pandora's Box with long term security implications for Pakistan especially on internal front.

But question is, can Pakistan remain isolated in this scenario and play neutral? Unfortunately, the answer is No because Pakistan is already part of this conflict on internal and media front. So Pakistan will have to play a role. Now question is; How?

The best course Pakistan can take is to engage Riyadh and Tehran aggressively to pacify the underlying larger historic conflict between the two. Yemen is just another manifestation of this old duel between Shia Iran and Salafi Saudi Arabia. Though there are other political and social factors are also involved but at its core this is emergence of hibernating sidewinder of sectarianism which is poisoning Muslim societies all over the world. The rise of Iraq's Sunni insurgency which was hijacked by Khawarij were also an outcome of this sectarian war.

Muslims all over the world are very emotional about the security of sacred places in Makkah and Madina. Pakistani nation is no exception in this regard. But the policies of Riyadh, just like Tehran, has compounded the situation in Middle East to such an extent that Muslims all over the world are being affected.

Pakistan's best policy option is to deploy its diplomatic prowess in this conflict including media and military diplomacy with only point agenda to make it clear that who is actually benefiting from this war and whose interests are being served. The real beneficiaries of this war are the Zionist forces of Israel who are looking to expand their political influence in the region.

Poll: Should Pakistan get involved in Yemen?

As crisis in Yemen is getting complex and compounded, the Saudi government has officially ask the Pakistani government to send troops and participate in action against Houthis rebels in ongoing war in Yemen. Pakistani government is yet to make an official decision on this sensitive request.

Saudi Arabia has a special status among general masses in Pakistan and an overwhelming majority would like Pakistani troops protecting the sacred land but this crisis in Yemen has very delicate sectarian dynamics as well. Keeping that in mind, it would not be an easy decision to make for government. Sending troops to fight Yemeni rebels would mean very different for both Sunni and Shias in Pakistan as this crisis in Yemen is outcome of a bloody proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Keeping this scenario in mind, what you think, how Pakistan must play its role in this crisis ( if any)?

Poll : Should Pakistan Send its Troops to Saudi Arabia to Fight Against ISIS?

Some media reports suggest that, during the ongoing visit of Pakistani Prime Minster Nawaz Sharif, Saudi Arabia would ask for more Pakistani troops to fight against the threats posed by ISIS to the Kindom. Pakistan Army is already stretched thin across the international border with India, Line of Control (LoC) and in FATA. What do you think about such demand? Should Pakistan send its troops to Saudi Arabia to fight against ISIS if asked by Saudi Government? Please contribute your answer in this poll.

Afghan Power Sharing Deal: Would it work?

Shahzad Masood Roomi

A power sharing deal between rival Afghan presidential candidates finally reached after months of tension. Timing of this deal is indeed intriguing as coalition prepares to withdraw. But an even more intriguing aspect of this entire political drama is the secrecy about how this deal was reached and under what conditions. It is worth remembering that earlier both sides had accused each other of fraud during the political standoff. But now suddenly, aides from both sides have confirmed the signing of the deal. 

The "Kings" and Kingmaker!

Irrespective of the fact, how and under what conditions this deal was reached. The real question every political analyst must ask is, Will it work? and if yes then how long this deal would last? Unfortunately, the content of the deal made available in public domain and the political history of Afghanistan both indicate that this deal would be nothing more than a temporary arrangement to bring some kind of political stability so that US can sell this to masses back home as their success in this protracted war before they leave the country by the end of this year.

The twitchy history of political harmony further endorses this assessment. In 1993, when Afghanistan was plunged in a bloody civil war, a similar power sharing deal was signed. It was called Islamabad Accord. In that accord, power was shared between more than 10 varying factions including Mohammad Yunus Khalis' breakaway faction of the Hezb-i-Islami, which has boycotted all past agreements. Afghanistan's minority Shi`ites, allies of Hekmatyar who have been demanding greater representation, were given the finance and health ministries. Major protagonists in that political episode were Tajik Ahmed Shah Masood and Pushtun Hekmatyar. 
 
Earlier that year, a peace deal was reached when after a year of shelling Hekmatyar's forces captured Defense Minister Masood's ministry building in Kabul. Hekmatyar is designated prime minister and a cease-fire is to be imposed. This peace deal, though, fulfilled the political ambitions of Hekmatyar to become Afghan Prime Minister but it never brought any peace in Afghanistan. The peace deal was brokered by foreign states (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran) and was not a native solution reached by varying Afghan factions themselves. Removal of Ahmed Shah Masood from defense ministry also didn’t help. The deal was ended just after two days when, as per archives of Library of Congress, Hekmatyar's allies of Hezb-e Wahdat again began rocketing areas in Kabul. Both the Wahhabi Pashtun Ittehad-i Islami of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf backed by Saudi Arabia and the Shia Hazara Hezb-e Wahdat supported by Iran remained involved in heavy fighting against each other. The envisioned peace could never be achieved as the peace accord miserably failed to address the far deeper fault lines of tribal society like ethnic, linguistic, tribal rifts.

But the failure of 1993 Afghan peace accord is not without precedent. A more recent example of similar political failure can be seen in Iraq, where the US invasion created an environment of frenzied sectarian strife fueled by both Saudi Arabia and Iran. And these history of failed peace making adopting non-inclusive approaches and ignoring the social realities are the reason behind the caveats for this recent power share deal signed between Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani. Evidently, the country is heading towards a similar political log jam witnessed in 1990s.

Apart from its inability to address these existing ethnic, sectarian and tribal fault lines this new deal have its intrinsic vulnerabilities as well. The provision of creating a new administrative position called Chief Executive Officer (CEO), which will be held by Abdullah Abdullah or one of his nominee, is going to create serious constitutional crisis in Afghanistan as it is certainly not clear at this point in time that how administrative powers would be balanced between these two power centers.  With this political delicacy, new Afghan government would also have to face the threats from Taliban insurgency. These concerns are being raised from within Afghan intelligentsia as well. "There will be two powers in the government, and it will be very difficult for them to work together," said Sediq Mansoor Ansari, an analyst and director of the Civil Societies Federation to AFP.

Furthermore, this power sharing deal would put a big question mark on Afghan democracy. People would have no idea about what happened to their votes. In short term, this may not seems to be an issue at all but it would cause dearly to Afghan state’s cohesion in coming months. 

Despite years of fighting Taliban remain defiant

It remains an unfortunate aspect of Afghan history that the country has been in perpetual state of war since last 40 years and there is no end in sight even now. A fragile country, with so many social fault lines, would remain vulnerable to political edginess if foreign players keep meddling into Afghan political affairs particularly Iran, India, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. US desperation for a political settlement is quite fathomable. As far as the American role in making both parties to reach this deal is concerned, by the initial American reaction it would be prudent to think that this deal has blessings from Washington. Americans wants to sign BSA (Bilateral Security Agreement) before draw down of the US/NATO forces completes by end of this year. This agreement, if signed, would enable the US military to stay in Afghanistan for minimum 10 years. Americans still believe that they can eliminate offcuts of Afghan resistance. Keeping the Afghan security profile of last 13 years, it would be prudent to assume that this idea wouldn’t work either. But it certainly would put the Americans into a position to protect the Afghan government. For now, the future of this power sharing deals hangs with just a reedy fiber of hope and optimism.